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11 Introduction
Suppose you are contesting a prize with a single adversary, where the highest
bidder wins the prize and both bidders loose their investment. Investments
have no opportunity cost and your adversary has a higher initial budget. If
you’d simply both invest your initial budget you’d loose with certainty, so
what do you do? You’d look for the possibility of gambling with your initial
budget in the hope of increasing it. Knowing this, the adversary will also
gamble with his initial budget. This paper solves for the optimal strategy and
pay-oﬀs in this all-pay auction game with known asymmetric initial budgets
under the assumption of the existence of a fair insurance market. We derive
existence and uniqueness for the two player, one slot (prize) game; uniqueness
and existence for the two player, T-slot game; existence and generic examples
for the n player, 1 slot game; and existence and an example of multiple
equilibria for the multiple slots, n player game.
Our most interesting result from the point of view of the auction literature
is that the pay-oﬀ function is non-standard. The dominant pay-oﬀ function in
the literature is the contest function for all-pay auctions proposed by Tullock
(1980) given by
f(si) S
f(sj).H e r esi denotes the budget of player i.T h i sp a y - o ﬀ
function was subsequently adapted and used by many others (eg. Cornes
and Hartley (2005)). The pay-oﬀ function in our two-player game with i =1
being the player with the smaller initial budget, turns out to be s1
2s2.T h e
major diﬀerence is the higher expected return to the person with the higher
budget over the Tullock (1980) contest. The intuition behind this result is
that on a fair insurance market player 1 can write a contract in which she
obtains the same budget as player 2 with probability s1
s2 (conditional on which
she’d have a 50% chance of winning the contest) and ends up with zero with
probability (1− s1
s2). Our main empirical prediction is that players with lower
budgets with positive probability make an eventual bid of zero, whereas the
player with the highest budget makes positive bids on all slots in all equilibria
we look at. This may help explain one of the stylized observation on political
lobbying (which is an example of an all-pay auction) that, ex post, some
2particular lobbying markets appear uncontested (see for instance Katz et al
1990).
By now, a large literature exists detailing the optimal strategy of bid-
ders in an all-pay auction under various valuation, information, budgetary,
and pre-commitment constraints. Hillman and Riley (1989) derived the
Nash-equilibrium of the 2-player, 1 slot all-pay auction under the assump-
tion of heterogeneous valuations without budget constraints. Extensions to
this basic all-pay auction framework have included the possibility of pre-
committment to lower valuations via delegation (Konrad et al. 2004), in-
complete information (Barut et al. 2002), sequential bids rather than simul-
taneous bids (Leininger 1991), and binding budget constraints (Laﬀont and
Robert, 1996).1 Baye et al. (1996) provide an early overview of the basic
1-slot all-pay auction and Klemperer (1999) provides a survey of the general
auction literature.
The model in our paper diﬀers in two important respects from the existing
literature. The main innovation is the presumption of a fair insurance market
where individuals can gamble with their initial budgets. This extension can
be given three justiﬁcations which delimit the interpretation of the results of
this paper.
The ﬁrst interpretation is to take the existence of a fair insurance lit-
erally and to interpret the results that way: individuals, departments, and
whole organisations can gamble on stock markets, option markets, and on
betting markets. Our paper shows how budget-constrained players should
1The paper by Laﬀont and Robert (1996) shares the assumption of our paper that
bidders are ﬁnancially constrained and that those constraints and the ensuing strategies
are common knowledge. Unlike them, we assume heterogeous budgets.
The idea to look at optimal bidding behavior in all-pay auctions rather than optimal
auction design is the spirit of Konrad et al. (2004). They ask whether delegation in all pay
auctions is an optimal strategy and show the optimal two-part contract a buyer will set
for an agent bidding on his behalf. This delegation in their model has the beneﬁto fp r e -
commting to having lower expected bids in the actual auction. The possibility of delegation
in our model would not change anything because players only care about winning and not
about the resources lost in the contest and thus there would be no beneﬁt to delegation.
3gamble with their initial budgets if the subsequent game is an all-pay auc-
tion. The natural starting assumption to study this situation is to presume
the existence of a fair insurance market.
A second rationale for the fair insurance assumption is to see the as-
sumption of fair insurance as the limit situation when players are playing
over very many slots simultaneously and have to allocate a ﬁxed budget over
these slots. Then, on average, each slot is allocated a certain amount of the
resource in expectation.
A ﬁnal rationale for the assumption of a fair insurance market is take fair
insurance as describing an intermediary stage. In the intermediary stage each
player can choose from a menu of possible investments on which the ﬁxed
budget is spent, where individuals can choose the result of that investment
strategy if the strategy works whereby the chance of success is inversely
related to that result. An example of diﬀerent strategies in the context of
a patent race would be to either thoroughly research everything such that
a certain level of innovation in a new product is reached with certainty, or
to research only a fraction and gamble that one nevertheless has hit upon a
big innovation by chance. The result of that intermediary stage then forms
the ‘bid’ in the outcome stage (the patent request), whereby the player with
the highest intermediary result wins. Again, a natural starting point for the
analysis of such a contest is to presume that the intermediary process in
which one can choose between levels of risks of failure is characterised by
fair insurance (i.e. the odds of achieving a result in the intermediary stage
is perfectly inversely related to the hight of the result).
A lesser diﬀerence between our paper and the existing literature is that in
our paper, we presume that players care only about the probability of winning
the contest. There are two main rationales for that assumption. One is that
it simply recognises that there are many situations where agents are given
a ﬁxed budget by a principle to achieve a given objective. Examples would
b ea nR & Dd e p a r t m e n tt h a ti sg i v e naﬁx e db u d g e tt ow i nap a t e n tr a c e
by a principal; sports institutes given a budget to produce as many winners
4as possible by a government; and a legal ﬁrm given a ﬁxed budget to win a
particular case. A secondary rationale for the assumption that the players
dont care about the invested resource is to ﬁt situations where the bid is not
monetary but is in terms of something with little opportunity value to the
player, such as campaigning eﬀort by a politician. A natural extension to
our work is to look at situations where there is an opportunity cost to the
resources put into the contest.
T h e r ea r em a n ym a r k e t st h a ta r es e tu pa sa l l - p a ya u c t i o n sa n dw h i c h
thereby form potential applications of our model. Konrad et al. (2004) argue
that all-pay auctions play an important role in many allocation processes,
from lobbying over political campaign spending and spatial competition to
sport contests, patent / R&D races, and military campaigns. Cornes and
Hartley (2005) additionally note that law cases, competitive research grants,
and status games are also all-pay auctions. Formalising these arguments,
Baye and Hoppe (2003) show that rent seeking contests, patent races and
innovation tournaments are strategically equivalent.
The paper proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst state the problem formally for
the two player case. Section 3 provides a solution for the two player multiple
objects case. We show existence and characterize the unique equilibrium. In
section 4 we show existence for the case of more than two players. In the
ﬁnal section we conclude and discuss possible extensions.
2 The basic 2-player problem
Consider the following problem: Two players, 1 and 2, simultaneously al-
locate scarce resources to T locations, which form the set Z = {1,..,T}.
Without loss of generality we assume that each location pays a identical re-
turn of 1 to the player who allocates more to the location in question. Both
players maximize their return and we require the resource constraint to be
fulﬁlled in expectation. Let Ts1 and Ts2 denote the total amount of the
resource available to players 1 and 2 and xz,y z the amount allocated to slot
5z by player 1,2 respectively. Without loss of generality we assume s1 ≤ s2.
Given that we look at mixed strategies, we denote by Fz
1 and Fz
2 the strate-



































F1 =a r g m a x
h F1
P1 for a given F2
F2 =a r g m a x
h F2
1 − P1 for a given F1
where I{.} is the indicator function and Fz
1,F z
2 denote the equilibrium c.d.f.’s
of player 1, 2 respectively for the choice of the amount of the resource allo-
cated to slot z and F1 =( F1
1,..,F T
1 ), F2 =( F1
2,..,F T
2 ) and similarly for e F1, e F2.
These c.d.f.’s are chosen strategically. What makes the problem non-trivial
is that equilibrium distributions Fz∗
1 and Fz∗
2 both have to be non degenerate
for all z.W ei n t u i t i v e l ya r g u et h i sh e r eb ys u p p o s i n gt h ec o n v e r s e .I fFz
1 was
degenerate in x for all z,t h e np l a y e r2 could overbid player 1 for this z and
P1 would be 0. Indeed, player 2 would overbid player 1 marginally in any
region z if xz was known with certainty. Converse, if yz was known, then the
optimal reaction of player 1 would be to overbid player 2 marginally in those
regions with lowest yz until mass runs out. Knowing this, the optimal yz
would be equal to s2,i nw h i c hc a s eP1 would be s1
s2 and player 2 could proﬁt
by switching to the same strategy as player 1. In equilibrium it thus cannot
be that for any z ∈ {1,..,T}, the strategies of players are not random.
We continue by solving for the 2 player 1 slot case, after which we extend
both the number of players and the number of slots.
63 Existence and Uniqueness for the case of
two players
Without loss of generality, we take 0 <s 1 ≤ s2. The following theorem settles
the existence problem.
Theorem 1. The following strategies form a Nash equilibrium of the game:






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 for x<0
1 − s1




2x for 0 <x≤ 2s2
1 for x>2s2






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 for y<0
1
2s2x for 0 ≤ y ≤ 2s2
1 for y>2s2 .
In this equilibrium P1 = s1
2s2.
Proof. A simple calculation shows that for these strategies the resource con-
straints (1) and (2) are satisﬁed.
Now if player 2 chooses Fz∗
2 , z =1 ,...,T,a n dp l a y e r1 invests an amount
of x ≥ 0 with probability one in slot z, then the expected payoﬀ of player 2
in z is equal to 0 if x>2s2 and equal to 1 − 1
2s2x otherwise. Consequently,
if player 2 chooses Fz∗
2 , z =1 ,...,T,a n dp l a y e r1 chooses Fz
1, z =1 ,...,T,
and respects his resource constraint, then the (average over slots) expected













































s1 by the resource constraint for player 1.
On the other hand, when player 1 chooses Fz∗
1 , z =1 ,...,T,a n dp l a y e r2
invests an amount of y ≥ 0 with probability one in slot z, then the expected















s2 if y =0 . Consequently, when
player 1 chooses Fz∗
1 , z =1 ,...,T, and player 2 chooses Fz
2, z =1 ,...,T,
and respects his resource constraint, then the (average over slots) expected





























































































Since for any choices of strategies by players 1 and 2 the (average over
slots) expected payoﬀs sum to one, it follows that the choices Fz∗
1 , z =
81,...,T,b yp l a y e r1 and Fz∗
2 , z =1 ,...,T,b yp l a y e r2 form an equilibrium.
The proof establishes in particular that in any equilibrium the expected
payoﬀ of player 1 is equal to s1
2s2 and the expected payoﬀ of 2 equal to 1− s1
2s2.
Thus in any existing equilibrium, the player having less resources wins less
than his share of the overall resources in the economy ( s1
2s2 < s1
s1+s2). The
basic idea of the proof is that, if player 2 uses a strategy to allocate the same
expected amount of the resource on each slot and a uniform distribution on
the interval [0,2s2],t h e np l a y e r1 cannot acquire more than P1 = s1
2s2. We
now show that the proposed mixing strategies are a unique equilibrium.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium strategies Fz∗
1 , Fz∗
2 , z =1 ,...,T,f r o mt h e
statement of Theorem 1 are the only equilibrium strategies.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case of only one slot. Suppose the pair (F1, F2)
is any equilibrium for this case. Then by the proof of Theorem 1, the pair
(F1, F∗
2) is an equilibrium, too. Clearly this implies that F1(2s2)=1 .L e t
g:[ 0 ,2s2] → [0,1] be given by g(0) = (1/2)F1(0),a n df o rx>0 by g(x)=
F1(x) if F1 is continuous at x and by g(x) = limx0↑x F(x0)+( 1 /2)(F1(x) −
limx0↑x F(x0)) otherwise. By Lemma 5 in the Appendix, the equilibrium
conditions with respect to F∗
2 and the fact that suppdF ∗
2 =[ 0 ,2s2] imply
that for some numbers α, β we have g(x)=α+βx for all x ∈ (0,2s2].T h u s
F1(x)=α + β(x) for all [0,2s2] (since F1 is right continuous at 0). An easy
calculation shows that the resource constraint for player 1 and the fact that
F1(2s2)=1imply that α =1− (s1/s2) and β = s1/(2s2
2) must hold. Thus
F1 = F∗
1. Similarly it follows that F2 = F∗
2.









is any equilibrium. We have to





The following terminology will be used in the rest of this proof. For real
numbers s0
1, s0
2 ≥ 0 and distribution functions F0
1, F0
1,w i t hF0
1(x)=0for
x<0 and F0
2(y)=0for y<0, we will say that the pair (F0
1,F 0




1 chosen by player 1 and F0
2 by player 2 forms
an equilibrium in the one slot problem where the resources of player 1 are
given by s0
1 and that of player 2 by s0
2.









Clearly, in any equilibrium, for both players 1 and 2 the resource condition
must hold with equality. Thus we must have
PT
z=1 sz





Now by the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 and the remarks follow-
ing that proof, the pair (F∗
1,F 2) is also an equilibrium. Clearly, this means
in particular that for each z the pair (Fz∗
1 ,F z
2) is a one slot equilibrium for
s1 and sz
2. By the uniqueness result for the one slot case established above,
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if x<0
1
2s1x if x ≤ 0 ≤ 2s1
1 if x>2s1 .
(4)






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if x<0
1 − s1




2x if 0 <x≤ 2s2
1 if x>2s2 .
If s1 <s 2 then it is immediate that (4) and (5) are consistent only if sz
2 = s2.
In case s1 = s2, (4) and (5) imply at least that s1 ≥ sz
2 must hold for all
10z, and then the resource constraint
PT
z=1 sz
2 = Ts 2 implies that also in this
case sz
2 = s2 for each z. Thus in any case, sz
2 = s2 for each z (since s1 ≤ s2
by hypothesis). That is, (Fz∗
1 ,F z
2) is a one slot equilibrium for s1 and s2.




Now to see that Fz
1 = Fz∗
1 must hold for each z, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h ep a i r
(F1,F 2) being an equilibrium implies that sz
1 > 0 for each z.F o r e a c h z
deﬁne a mapping φ
















yz if yz ≥ sz
1 ,
and deﬁne a mapping φ: RT









By the argument of the proof of Theorem 1, the fact that the pair (F1, F2) is
an equilibrium implies that the pair (F1, F∗
2) is an equilibrium, too. It follows
that for each z, the pair (Fz
1,F z∗
2 ) is a one slot equilibrium for sz
1 and s2.
By the remarks following the proof of Theorem 1, then, the expected payoﬀ
of player 2 in the one slot equilibrium (Fz
1,F z∗
2 ) is equal to s2
2sz
1 if s2 <s z
1
and is equal to 1 −
sz
1
2s2 if s2 ≥ sz
1. Consequently the total expected payoﬀ of
player 2 in the equilibrium (F1,F ∗
2) is equal to φ(s2,...,s 2).
The mapping φ attains a maximum at (y1,...,yT)=( s2,...,s 2) over
the set {(y1,...,yT) ∈ RT
+:
PT
z=1 yz = Ts 2}. Indeed, suppose there would
be an (y1,...,yT) ∈ RT
+ with
PT
z=1 yz = Ts 2 such that φ(y1,...,yT) >
φ(s2,...,s 2). Again by the proof of Theorem 1, there is a strategy F0 =
(F10,...,FT0) such that for each slot z,
R ∞
0 yd Fz0
Y (y)=yz and such that the
expected payoﬀ for z is ≥
yz
2sz
1 if yz <s z
1 and is ≥ 1−
sz
1
2yz if yz ≥ sz
1.I tf o l l o w s
that the total expected payoﬀ of F0 is larger than φ(s2,...,s 2), contradicting
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ep a i r(F1,F∗
2) is an equilibrium.
Observe now that each mapping φ
z is diﬀerentiable in yz and that the
derivative with respect to yz is strictly decreasing on the interval [sz
1,∞).A l s o
11 







Figure 1: Equilibrium strategies for s1 =1and s2 =2:Fz∗





2 ) being a one slot equilibrium for sz
1 and s2 means that
s2 ≥ sz
1 must hold by the uniqueness result for the one slot case. Consequently









z = Ts 2}
implies that the sz
1 ’s must coincide whence, by the resource constraint for
player 1, sz
1 = s1 must hold for each z.T h u s ,f o re a c hz,t h ep a i r(Fz
1,F z∗
2 )
is a one slot equilibrium for s1 and s2. By the uniqueness result for the one
slot case again, we may conclude that Fz
1 = Fz∗
1 for each z. This completes
the proof of the theorem.
The equilibrium allocation follows a clear-cut mixing rule. For player 2
it is optimal to allocate to any region z an independent random draw from
the uniform distribution on the range [0,2s2]. The equilibrium response of
player 1 is to choose 0 with probability 1 −
s1
s2 and a random draw of the
same uniform distribution as the one by player 2 with probability
s1
s2.T h e
pictures below illustrate this result.
Putting this result into the context of a motivating example, say the
political game with two parties spending a ﬁxed campaign budget over a
12continuum of elections: for the bigger party 2, who has on average s2 to
spend in each of the elections it contests, it is optimal to randomly choose
an amount y in the range [0,2s2] with each amount having equal probability.
Simultaneously, party 1 would decide with probability (1 −
s1
s2) not to spend
any resources on that particular election at all, and with probability
s1
s2 would
spend a positive amount of resources, randomly choosing an amount x to
spend from the range [0,2s2] with each point having equal probability. This
choice process is then repeated in all the elections that these two parties
simultaneously contest: in each election the parties take fresh draws from F1




4 Existence with more than two agents.
It is convenient to ﬁrst treat the special case of only one slot (Section 4.1).
Existence of equilibrium in the multiple slots case will follow easily from
existence in the one slot case (Section 4.2).
4.1 The special case of one slot
We use the following notation:
• There are n agents j =1 ,...,nwith resources sj > 0.
• 0 <r 1 <r 2 ...<r m are the levels of resources appearing among the n
agents.
• ni, i =1 ,...,m, denotes the number of agents j with sj = ri.
The term “distribution function on R+”m e a n saw e a k l yi n c r e a s i n ga n d
right-continuous function F : R+ → R+ such that limx→∞F(x)=1 .
The proof of equilibrium existence is organized in a series of lemmata.
Lemma 1. Let Gj be a distribution function on R+ for each j =1 ,...,n.





(b) There are real numbers αj ≥ 0 and βj > 0 such that
(i)
Q
j06=j Gj0(x) ≤ αj + βjx for all x ∈ R+;
(ii)
Q
j06=j Gj0(x)=αj + βjx for Gj-almost all x ∈ R+.
(c) Gj(0) = 0 if
Q
j06=j Gj0(0) > 0.
(d) The function
Q
j06=j Gj0(·) is continuous at Gj-almost all x ∈ R+.
Then (G1,...,G n) is an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any j and let Hj be any distribution function on R+ such
that
R
R+ xdH j(x) ≤ sj Note that if j sets some amount x with certainty,
then his expected payoﬀ is ≤
Q
j06=j Gj0(x),a n di s=
Q
j06=j Gj0(x) if x>0












≤ αj + βjsj ,









= αj + βjsj .
This completes the proof.
The next two lemmata essentially give a heuristic for ﬁnding equilibria.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of how strategies generically look like for
this heuristic. In this example s1 =1 ,s 2 =2and s3 =3 . The stratagies
are characterized by two critical values, a maximum bid c0,i nt h i sc a s e
14c0 =6 .9358 and a critical value c1, in this example c1 =3 .8456. 2 All players
distribute their bids over the interval [0;c0]. T h es t r a t e g i e so fa l lp l a y e r sa r e
continuous piecewise deﬁned distribution functions. Players 1 and 2 have
a positive probability mass on 0. Player 1 never bids any positive amount
below c1 and concentrates all his budget on high bids. Player 2 and 3 have
a positive probability for all bids between 0 and the maximum bid c0.3
Given these strategies every player is indiﬀerent between any distribution
of bids that fulﬁll his or her budget requirement.
Lemma 2. Suppose n>2 and nm > 1.L e tFi, i =1 ,...,m, be distribution
functions on R+ with
R
R+ xdF i(x)=ri for each i =1 ,...,m.S u p p o s e




i<m(Fi(x))ni = βx for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/β;
(ii) c1 >c 2 ...>c m−1 >c m =0 ;
(iii) Fi(x)=m a x {Fm(x),F m(ci)} for each i =1 ,...,m− 1;
Then (G1,...,G n) with Gj = Fi if sj = ri is an equilibrium.
2In a general version with players with m diﬀerent levels of budgets there are m − 1
critical values, each with the feature that a player with a budget rk has no probability
mass on bids below ck.






a + bc1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ c1
√







a+bc1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ c1
√













a+bx for c1 <x≤ c0
,
where c0 = 1−a
b =6 .9358, a =0 .237754, b =0 .109901and c1 =3 .8456.







Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies for the case s1 =1(yellow), s2 =2(green),
s3 =3(black).
Proof. Conditions (a) to (d) of Lemma 1 hold, with αj =0and βj = β for
each j =1 ,...,n.
Lemma 3. Suppose n>2 and nm =1 .L e tFi, i =1 ,...,m, be distribution
functions on R+ with
R
R+ xdF i(x)=ri for each i =1 ,...,m. Suppose there









1−αx for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1−α
β ;
(iii) c1 >c 2 ...>c m−2 >c m−1 =0 ;
(iv) Fi(x)=m a x {Fm−1(x),F m−1(ci)} for each i =1 ,...,m− 2;
Then (G1,...,G n) with Gj = Fi if sj = ri is an equilibrium.
Proof. Conditions (a) to (d) of Lemma 1 hold, with αj = α and βj = β for
that j with sj = rm,a n dαj =0and βj = β/(1 − α) for the other j’s.
The next lemma provides the main tool to establish that strategies as given
by the previous lemmata indeed exist.
16Lemma 4. Let p ≥ 2 be an integer, let qi ≥ 1 be an integer for each i =
1,...,p,a n dl e t0 <t 1 <t 2 ...<t p be real numbers. Then:
(I) Given any number a ∈ [0,1) there are distribution functions Fi on R+,




xdGi(x)=ti for each i =1 ,...,p
a n ds u c ht h a tf o rs o m er e a ln u m b e r sb(a) > 0 and c1 >c 2 ...>c p =0
(ii)
Qp
i=1(Fi(x))qi = a + 1−a
b(a)x for all 0 ≤ x ≤ b(a),a n d
(iii) Fi(x)=m a x {Fp(x),F p(ci)} for each i =1 ,...,p− 1.
(II) Moreover, given any number r>t p,t h en u m b e ra c a nb ec h o s e ni n












Proof: see Appendix. In Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we proposed candidates
for equilibrium strategies. With the help of Lemma 4 we show in the proof
of the following theorem the existence of these strategies.
Theorem 3. An equilibrium exists in the one slot case with any ﬁnite num-
ber of agents.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that nm ≥ 2.L e tF1,...,F m be distribution functions
on R+, chosen according to Lemma 4(I), with a =0 , p = m, ti = ri for
all i =1 ,...,p, qi = ni for i =1 ,...,p− 1,b u t ( ! ) qp = nm − 1.L e t
G1,...,G n be deﬁned as in the statement of Lemma 2. Then, by Lemma 2,
(G1,...,G n) is an equilibrium. For the case nm =1 ,l e tF1,...,F m−1 be
distribution functions on R+ chosen according to Lemma 4, with p = m−1,
17ti = ri and qi = ni for i =1 ,...,m−1, such that the number a is so that (∗∗)
of that lemma holds for r = rm and the distribution function F determined
by (∗). Then for each j with sj = ri <r m,s e tGi = Fi, and for that j
with rj = rm set Gj = F.w h e r eF is the distribution function according to
part (II) of Lemma 4. A glance at Lemma 3 reveals that (G1,...,G n) is an
equilibrium.
4.2 The case of multiple slots
As before, there are n agents j =1 ,...,nwith resources Ts j > 0 for each j,
where T denotes the number of slots. By Theorem 3, there is an n-tuple
(G1,...,Gn) of distribution functions on R+ which constitutes a partial equi-
librium in any single slot when each agent invests an amount sj of his re-
sources in each slot. For each j =1 ,...,n,l e tFj be the T-tuple of distribu-
tion functions on R+ given by Fz
j = Gj for each z =1 ,...,T.W ec l a i mt h a t
the n-tuple (F1,...,F n) constitutes an equilibrium for the T slots problem.













i.e. the resource constraint holds for Fj. Observe that since each agent
i 6= j chooses the same strategy Gi in each slot, j is confronted with the
same payoﬀ function in each single slot. Let us denote this payoﬀ function
common for all slots by πj.( T h a ti s ,πj(x), x ∈ R+, is the expected payoﬀ
when j invests an amount of x with certainty in any of the single slots.) Now
suppose there is a T-tuple Hj =( H1
j,...,HT
j ) of distribution functions on
R+, i.e. of strategies for the single slots z =1 ,...,T, such that the resource
constraint holds for Hj a n ds u c ht h a tHj yields a expected payoﬀ larger than


































































But this amounts to a contradiction to the fact that (G1,...,Gn) is a partial
equilibrium in any single slot for the resources sj.W e m a y c o n c l u d e t h a t
(F1,...,F n) is an equilibrium for the T slots problem. Thus we have shown:
Theorem 4. An equilibrium exists for the multiple slots problem.
This theorem establishes existence for the multi player multi slot problem.
A simple example shows that equilibria in this case are not unique. Take as an
example the case of 2 slots and 3 players, with the ﬁrst two players having
an equal amount of resources equal to s1 = s2 = b, a n dt h et h i r dp l a y e r
having double the amount of resources of the other players, i.e. s3 =2 b.
In one equilibrium, player 1 allocates b to the ﬁrst market, and 0 to the
second market; player 2 allocates 0 to the ﬁrst market and b to the second
market. The third player allocates b to market 1 and b to market 2. On
each market, the players allocating positive expected resources play as in
the 2-player game. Hence, the highest observable bid in this equilibrium is
given as c1 =2 b and given the equilibrium allocation an additional marginal
unit spend on any of the slots yields the same payoﬀ equal to 1
2b for every
player on every market, making all players indiﬀerent between the equilibrium
and any alternative allocation in that equilibrium. Hence the proposed ﬁrst
19equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. Payoﬀs are then proportional to the
share of each agent of the total budget, i.e. player 3’s payoﬀ (expected
proportion of all markets won) is 0.5 and that of player 1 and 2 is 0.25
each. Consider now a second equilibrium where player 1 and player 2 each
allocate b
2 to both market 1 and market 2, and player 3 allocates b to market
1a n db to market 2. On each market, players play according to the multiple
player on one market allocation of Lemma 4. In that case, the highest bid
with positive probability is c1 ≈ b ∗ 2.12 and the payoﬀ of player 3 is 0.588
whereas the payoﬀ of player 1 and player 2 is 0.206 each. Marginal payoﬀs
to player 1 and 2 in each market is now 1
c1 whereas it equals 1
c1 ∗ (1 − 0.22)
for player 3 on both markets, whereby marginal payoﬀs are non-increasing.
Thus, no player can improve their payoﬀ and the proposed second equilibrium
holds. Interestingly enough, this example shows that expected payoﬀsa r en o t
unique in the multiple slot case whilst they are unique in the N slots, 2 player
game. In the shown equilibrium of the 1 slot game, there is a positive bonus
(≡expected payoﬀ -(share of resources)) to being the single biggest player. In
t h em u l t i p l es l o tc a s et h i sb o n u sm a yd i s a p p e a ri ft h eb i g g e s tp l a y e ro v e r a l l
is not the biggest (i.e. highest amount of resources) in any of the individual
slots. This is exactly the situation in the ﬁrst equilibrium given above, where
player 1 and 2 both increased their payoﬀs by concentrating their resources
on one market, thereby denying the the bonus to the biggest player of being
the biggest in either of the two markets. Unfortunately, we cannot ﬁnd an
example for multi player, one slot game of multiple equilibria and conjecture
that the 1 slot game equilibrium is unique.
5 Conclusions, applications and extensions
The theorems in this paper have straightforward applications. For one, they
are prescriptive theorems that can be used in practise by budget constrained
players facing an all-pay auction who have access to a fair insurance market.
They should thus for instance be useful to campaign managers of politicians,
20and the managers of R&D departments engaged in patent races. The theo-
rems in this paper can also be used as predictive theorems of the allocation
of resources we should observe in practise in these instances. The predic-
tion that the smaller party doesn’t contest some regions at all whilst the
bigger party always contests all regions is particularly suited for empirical
applications.
An extension is to vary the payoﬀ over slots from winning. We can ac-
commodate this into our framework by interpreting a ‘large slot’ as nothing
more than having a higher weight. Speciﬁcally, we can introduce a weight-
ing function w(t) with t denoting the slot where w(t) is always positive and
has expectation 1 over all slots. The payoﬀ in t gets multiplied with this
weight. All the reasoning of the theorem goes through. For instance, in the
two-player case we get exactly the same mixing distributions F∗
A and F∗
B as
long as we multiply the randomly chosen Xz and Y z for the slot with pay-oﬀ
1b yw(z), i.e. the allocated expected budgets and bids are proportional to
the proﬁto ft h es l o t .
Another natural extension is to introduce the assumption that bidders
care about the resources lost in the auction. We’d anticipate that this would
have to mean an increase in the marginal probability of winning the contest
for an additional bid, which in turn would suggest that the average bids
would reduce. Introducing an opportunity costs of bids also reintroduces the
questions of optimal auction design and entry issues (with zero opportunity
costs, all available resources will be spent in any auction where additional
resources imply a higher probability of winning the contest, which makes the
issue of design trivial). A promising area of future research in the line we have
opened lies in the multiple slots case, where our investigation has shown the
possibility of non-unique pay-oﬀs and strategies. It would be interesting to
further investigate the case with one big player and various small ones where
tacit collusion between small players by not bidding on each others’ market
can bring them beneﬁts whilst remaining optimal for each smaller player.
Such a situation would especially seem to be important for military and
21political markets where groups of smaller players sometimes tacitly collude
against a single big player and sometimes do not. A thought would be to see
what happens if one would allow for contractable side-payments.
6A p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 4:
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a,b




22(This construction can be done because 0 <t 1 <t 2 ...<t p by hypothesis.)
Observe that the numbers c
a,b




i (x), i =1 ,...,p,
depend continuously on (a,b).4 In particular, if (an,b n) → (a,b) in [0,1) ×
R++,t h e nF
an,bn
i (x) → F
a,b
i (x) for every x ∈ R+ and each i.M o r e o v e r ,f o r
any ﬁxed a ∈ [0,1),i fb is suﬃciently large then ca,b
p > 0, while if b>0 is
suﬃciently small then ca,b
p =0 .B u t i f ca,b



















i (x)=ti for each 1 ≤ i ≤ p−1, again by construction. Thus (I)
o ft h el e m m af o l l o w si nv i e wo ft h ew a yt h ef u n c t i o n sF
a,b
i were deﬁned. As
for part (II), note ﬁrst that our construction guarantees that for any given






p > 0,s ot h en u m b e rb(a) from the previous paragraph is uniquely
determined. It is evident that if an → a in [0,1 then the sequence (b(an))
must be bounded. Combining these facts with the fact mentioned above
that the numbers c
a,b




i (x), i =1 ,...,p,d e p e n d
continuously on (a,b) one ﬁnds that the mapping a 7→ b(a) is continuous





p (x) for every x ∈ R+. Consequently, for the distribution functions F
a










p (x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ b(a)
we have that if an → a in [0,1) then F
an(x) → F
a















p (x), while if an → 1 we must have b(an) →∞implying that
F
an(x) → 0 for each x>0 and hence that
R
R+ xdF
an(x) →∞ .T h u s( I I )o f
the lemma follows.
4To see this and some of the points mentioned in the sequel, use for instance the fact





23In the following lemma, z is a real number > 0 and P is the set of all
(Borel-) probability measures on [0,z].
Lemma 5. Let g:[ 0 ,z] → R+ be an increasing function, let μ ∈ P with
suppμ =[ 0 ,z], and suppose (∗)
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0 for all μ





Then for some numbers α, β we must have g(x)=α + βx for all x ∈ [0,z]
with x>0.T h a ti s ,o n(0,z], g is the restriction of an aﬃne function.
Proof. Since g is increasing and suppμ =[ 0 ,z], it is readily seen that (∗)
and (∗∗)i m p l yt h a tg must be continuous at every x ∈ [0,z] with x>0.I t
follows that we may assume that g is also continuous at 0.L e t M be the
vector space of all bounded signed Borel measures on [0,z] and let Iμ be the
order ideal in M generated by μ;t h a ti s ,
Iμ = {μ
0 ∈ M : −nμ ≤ μ
0 ≤ nμ for some n ∈ N}.
Let 1 be the function from [0,z] to R that is constant equal to 1,a n dl e tq1,



















Let q1, q2,a n dq3 denote the restrictions to Iμ of q1, q2,a n dq3, respectively.
Let ker denote the kernel of a linear mapping. Evidently (∗)a n d( ∗∗)i m p l y
that kerq2∩kerq3 ⊂ kerq1. According to a standard fact from linear algebra
this means that q1 = αq2 + βq3 for some real numbers α and β.N o ws i n c e
suppμ =[ 0 ,z], Iμ is weak∗ dense in M.S i n c e q1, q2,a n dq3 all are weak∗
continuous it follows that q1 = αq2+βq3 whence g has the form g(x)=α+βx,
x ∈ [0,z].
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